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Abstract
After the collapse of the bipolar international order, NATO has been focused on its desire to eradicate 
Cold War divisions and to build good relations with Russia. However, the security environment, 
especially in Europe, is still dramatically changing. The NATO Warsaw Summit was focused especially 
on NATO’s deteriorated relations with Russia that affect Europe’s security. At the same time, it 
looked at bolstering deterrence and defence due to many concerns coming from eastern European 
allies about Russia’s new attitude in international relations. The Allies agreed that a dialogue with 
Russia rebuilding mutual trust needs to start. In the times when Europe faces major crisis from its 
southern and south-eastern neighbourhood - Western Balkan countries, Syria, Libya and Iraq - and 
other threats, such as terrorism, coming from the so-called Islamic State, causing migration crises, it 
is necessary to calm down relations with Russia. The article brings out the main purpose of NATO in a 
transformed world, with the accent on Europe, that is constantly developing new security conditions 
while tackling new challenges and threats.
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Introduction
The NATO summit in Warsaw, the second meeting on a high level since 
the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, represents a cornerstone in 
the adaptation of the alliance to that new complex security scenario 
in international relations. NATO’s essential mission has stayed the same: 
to ensure that the alliance remains a community of freedom, peace, 
security and shared values, including individual liberty, human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law, with the accent on Europe keeping 
transatlantic ties strong and important for NATO’s global role. The 
alliance will continue effectively fulfilling all three core tasks as set 
out in its Strategic Concept agreed at the summit in Lisbon in 2010: 
collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. 
These tasks remain fully relevant and complementary, and contribute 
to safeguarding the freedom and security of all NATO members. 
In Warsaw, NATO focused strongly on the mutual commitment to 
defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all its members, while 
deterring attacks with its full range of capabilities, including nuclear 
ones (Corvaja 2016: 5). 
Although it could be noted that in the development of all main theories 
of international relations (neorealism, liberal institutionalism and social 
constructivism) after the end of the Cold War it was predicted that NATO 
would cease to exist after the bipolar world collapsed, as its purpose 
of defending the Western world and Europe against threats coming 
from the East would not be needed any more, NATO went through a 
transformation and showed its new purpose in a changed world. NATO 
was no longer regarded only as an alliance and, as neorealists claim, 
if this transformation never happened, the alliance would have no 
purpose without the opposite side. By adjusting to the national interests 
of the member states, it attracts new countries to become members 
and justifies its role of transformed alliance.1
Defending the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all its members 
1 The neorealist perspective of NATO’s transformation and reasons for it are presented in Waltz (1993, 2000). International 
institutions adjust to the needs of the states and their national interests, so NATO stopped being an ordinary alliance. 
On the definition of the alliance, see more in Walt (1997).
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became again, in the new context, one of the main tasks of a 
transformed NATO. Together with recently aggravated relations with 
Russia, ongoing instabilities in the Middle East and new challenges 
in the Western Balkans, NATO is again met with new challenges 
and is at the crossroads of further adapting its enlargement policy, 
while Europe is facing a major refugee crisis, a crisis in Ukraine that 
started with Russian military intervention in Crimea, the rise of radical 
Islam and terrorism, constant instabilities in the Western Balkans, an 
accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile 
technology, the growing threat of cyberattacks, climate change, 
risks of disruption to energy supplies, more and more unemployed 
and poor people, all kinds of international criminal activities, etc. All 
of these ‘obstacles’ are today challenging Euro-Atlantic security and 
the international order.
The persistence of NATO after the Cold War was very important for 
Euro-Atlantic stability and security, and Waltz, as a neorealist, sees 
it as a possibility for allies to control each other in many ways, while 
having collective defence as a main task that still specifies NATO as 
an alliance.2 This essay will bring out the reasons Europe needs NATO, 
despite its creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. While 
tackling the main research question, the theory of neorealism will be 
used in describing how NATO is transforming, especially in regard to 
decisions reached during the Warsaw Summit, where it began to be 
clear that defence and deterrence are the bedrock of NATO and an 
indispensable foundation for any activities undertaken by NATO. 
The research concentrates on presenting a perspective of NATO 
from the view of Euro-Atlantic security, highlighting the importance 
of cooperation among members and partner states. The essay will 
show an inevitable role of NATO in the perseverance of European 
security, due to new threats and challenges, from the perspective of 
the conclusions and decisions reached at the Warsaw Summit. 
2 It can be said, looking from the perspective of neorealism, that states join alliances to ensure the behaviour of other 
allies, advancing the interests of their foreign policy and trying to reduce the uncertainty of the international system, 
which neorealists define as international anarchy. Neorealists see states and great powers as central to world politics, 
characterized as anarchy, which additionally causes them to be within an alliance (Waltz 1979; Waltz 1993: 44–79).
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Warsaw Summit: theoretical and practical 
framework
Theoretical framework
There is a distinction between alliances as a response to power and as a 
response to threat, according to neorealists. If we look at how Stephen 
Walt explains it, we can see that the distribution of power is an extremely 
important factor, and “the level of threat is affected by geographic 
proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions” (Walt 1997: 5). 
Looking from this perspective, it could be noted that new Russia poses 
more of a threat than a power, so with the new security environment 
in the contemporary international community in mind, NATO’s strategy 
presented in Warsaw was mainly directed towards Russia’s action in 
Crimea and what kind of a threat it presents. There is a suggestion by Glen 
Snyder that “alliances cannot be understood apart from their context in 
the international system” (Snyder 1997: 16). The nature of NATO, therefore, 
varies with the changes that occur in the international arena, and with 
the new role of Russia, global security and stability goes through a shifting 
of power. Multipolarity is described with a lack of clarity in international 
politics, and NATO stands to reduce the uncertainty; however, in the 
absence of a single point of danger, “alliance collapse is a far more 
imminent possibility” (Snyder 1990: 121) The reason for NATO’s survival is 
that the alliance has managed to stay relevant as a tool for managing 
modern conflicts while being open and inclusive, not only for new 
members, but also for different kinds of partnership.
When entering an alliance, states may either balance (ally in opposition 
to the principal source of danger) or bandwagon (ally with the state 
that poses the major threat) (Walt 1985: 4). Balancing is alignment with 
the weaker side; bandwagoning means to choose the stronger. Walt’s 
conclusion is that the threat determines the choice of ally and how long 
the alliance will last. The balance of threat theory is based on balancing 
behaviour and the proposition that states will join alliances in order to 
avoid domination by stronger powers. States join alliances to protect 
themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (80) - 2017
9
a threat (Walt 1985: 5). That is what Walt offers as the reason that NATO 
has begun transformation, having the goal to position itself strongly in the 
international order. Neorealism offers an insight into reasons why states 
choose to be under the NATO umbrella, as it offers them a possibility to 
achieve their goals and feel safe in the international arena. 
The Warsaw Summit was a summit that showed the need for a high level of 
unity among member states. It showed the importance of a Euro-Atlantic 
partnership that becomes real through NATO and brings the anarchy in the 
international arena more under control. NATO, as an intergovernmental 
organization with a core competence of security, has developed 
additional diverse institutions for conducting its actions. Therefore, NATO is 
always more than just an alliance, but primarily an alliance. The European 
Union has developed a defence dimension, with military forces as part 
of its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and 
Defence Policy, but its process in building a common military force, or ‘EU 
Army’, has been rather too slow to guarantee security and stability on the 
old continent.
Warsaw Summit in decisions
There is an arc of insecurity and instability along NATO’s periphery 
(challenges and threats originate both from the eastern and the southern 
flanks of NATO) and beyond, so NATO’s Warsaw Summit offered a vision 
of the future of the alliance in 3D: deterrence, defence and dialogue 
(Luciolli 2016: 21). NATO decided in Warsaw to establish an enhanced 
forward presence in its eastern flank (Baltic, Poland) to demonstrate its 
determination, solidarity and ability to act by triggering an immediate 
allied response to any aggression. Beginning in early 2017, an enhanced 
forward presence will comprise a multinational force provided by 
framework nations (USA, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom) and 
other contributing allies on a voluntary, sustainable and rotational basis. 
They will be based on four battalion-sized battle groups. At the same time, 
after the Warsaw Summit, the alliance should remain open for dialogue 
even with those who do not share the Euro-Atlantic democratic norms and 
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values. NATO should develop cooperative arrangements (with both state 
and non-state actors) with all partners willing to work and cooperate with 
the alliance. In response to asymmetrical and non-military threats, NATO 
should offer its unique capabilities and experience to other organizations 
or formats that may be better suited to solve multi-dimensional crises. 
Besides all the other challenges to stability and security in the contemporary 
world, the Russian Federation is seen by NATO as the main destabiliser of 
the European security architecture. The international community should 
not have been surprised by Russian action in Crimea and its subsequent 
influence in Donbas, eastern Ukraine. The December 2014 Military Doctrine 
and the December 2015 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation 
state that Russia sees the United States and NATO as adversaries and Russia 
as the leader of a new anti-NATO alliance in a multipolar world. In Ukraine, 
the Russian Federation used military force and other forms of warfare to 
acquire territory, decisively breaking international law and reneging on 
its commitment to international agreements. Russia’s action rang alarm 
bells in those NATO members who border the Russian Federation. The main 
publicly declared pretext for Russia’s actions in Ukraine and Crimea was 
protection of a Russian-speaking minority in those regions. Some NATO 
members are now afraid that such behaviour might be used as a pretext for 
further Russian action against some other countries among its neighbours 
(Baltic states, Poland), because Moscow has made no secret of its belief 
that its neighbours should be firmly within its sphere of influence (Hill and 
Gaddy 2013: 312–314). Thus, the Russian annexation of Crimea effectively 
ended a 25-year effort by NATO to build a strategic partnership3 with that 
country (Čehulić Vukadinović 2010: 190–210).
Also, this was a showcase for Russia’s new hybrid warfare tactics.4 Russia’s 
3 In 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for dialogue and cooperation 
with former members of the Warsaw Pact. In May 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, the landmark document which 
laid the foundation of the post-Cold War NATO-Russia relationship, was signed. That document affirmed the shared 
commitment of both parties to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, for the benefit of all its 
people. In 2002, the NATO-Russia Council was established. This is a joint decision-making body bringing together the 28 
allies and Russia. NATO even went so far as to suggest that Russia could have a role in supporting the missile defence 
system put in place to defend allies against a potential ballistic missile attack from the Middle East (Turner 2016: 8).
4 Russian General Valery Garasimov, Chief of the General Staff, described in February 2013 the new Russian hybrid 
warfare techniques, stating that “the very rules of war have changed. The role of non-military means of achieving 
political and strategic goals has gone, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their 
effectiveness. The focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, 
economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures, applied in coordination with the protest 
potential of the population. All this is supplemented by military means of a concealed character, including carrying 
out actions of informational conflict and the action of special operations forces. The open use of force, often under 
the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation, is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of 
final success in the conflict” (Gerasimov 2013: 2).
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rhetoric against NATO, including threats of a nuclear attack, is backed 
by Russia conducting both ground military exercises and air activities 
close to the borders of some NATO members. Furthermore, Moscow has 
accelerated the deployment of conventional capabilities along NATO’s 
borders. Deployment of Russia’s air defence system, coastal defence 
system and anti-access area denial (A2/D2) capabilities in Kaliningrad and 
Crimea have the aim of intimidating the alliance and turning the balance 
of forces to Moscow’s advantage. Also, any ground reinforcement would 
have to transit through the narrow land corridor of Suwalki linking Poland 
and Lithuania between Kaliningrad and Belarus. For all those reasons, 
NATO member states bordering the Russian Federation with a substantial 
ethnic Russian population feel very vulnerable, especially in the case 
of a Russian military attack on one of the eastern NATO allies (Andzans 
2016: 14–20). The new democracies in central and eastern Europe were 
invited to join the alliance but Article 5 security guarantees were not 
supported by the new NATO command and force structure necessary to 
secure the defence of these new NATO members. Russian capabilities, 
patterns of behaviour and political-military messaging make it clear that 
Russia perceives the post-Soviet space as its sphere of influence, wants 
to maintain a buffer zone extending into European Union and NATO 
territory, and is attempting to enforce the creation of a new security 
architecture that would allow it to weigh in on the defence and security 
choices of sovereign states. For Russia, the best way to achieve this could 
be by undermining the credibility of the alliance, making it irrelevant 
as a collective defence organization. This would represent a significant 
strategic victory for the Russian Federation (Lorenz 2016: 10).
There is no doubt that the extraordinary engagement and commitment 
of the United States is crucial for Euro-Atlantic and European security. 
However, at the Warsaw Summit, real progress in cooperation between 
NATO and the European Union was achieved. The joint declaration (NATO 
2016b) signifies that NATO and the European Union should work closely to 
address security challenges such as the migration crisis, terrorism, hybrid 
threats, cyber defence or energy security. But do the Europeans have a 
united political voice? Or, more importantly, are they capable of fulfilling 
such tasks together with the United States and Canada? The European 
Union is still facing the consequences of its institutional, financial and 
migrant crises (Fata 2011: 33–39) and, with the rise of populism, isolationism 
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and extremism, the majority of members are not willing to increase the 
defence budget. Besides the external threats (Russia the main one), 
NATO is facing many internal challenges today, mostly connected with 
its European member states or its relations with the European Union. The 
very popular trend of building an EU Army, which would lead to greater 
autonomy of the European Union in defence matters, is proving insufficient 
for European security and stability: “Military operations will occur in ad hoc 
coalitions that rely on both NATO and EU means, thus resulting in a type of 
institutional interdependence, but US superiority and European weakness 
will in the context of coercion create a new type of military dependency” 
(Rynning 2002).
Russian influence on NATO’s Eastern members
The July 2016 Warsaw Summit marked a turbulent time for NATO. Eastern 
members of NATO, led by Poland, were calling upon NATO to bring a bigger 
armed presence to their countries. After long and difficult negotiations, 
the member states concluded that a bigger military presence in Poland 
and the Baltic states was needed and that four multinational brigades 
would be sent to those countries under the command of officers from the 
USA, Great Britain, Germany and Canada. Also, NATO would continue 
to build its anti-rocket shield in Romania and increase the presence of 
NATO navies in the Black Sea (Public Diplomacy Division 2016: 1). The 
goal of these measures is to let the Russian Federation know that any 
further unilateral decisions made by Russia (such as in Ukraine) will not 
be tolerated, which is also a message of support to the Eastern European 
member states. 
The Warsaw Summit had the aim of showing Russia that a homogeneous 
group of alliance members was determined to maintain liberal 
democracy and human rights. The same group equally condemned 
the unilateral actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine and would 
condemn Russian actions in Syria. However, the Russian Federation, with 
its diplomatic channels, managed to make a division between some 
member states and NATO: if this situation persists, some of them could 
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become advocates for its policies within NATO. Countries like Hungary 
have traditionally had turbulent relations with Russia, but those relations 
have significantly improved in the last decade due to economic ties and 
dependence on Russian oil and gas, and because of a dependence on 
Russian military equipment. On the other side, there is Poland, regarded as 
the forefront of the anti-Russian bloc in NATO, and the challenges arising 
from within. Some experts in international relations say that if Poland 
continues to feel marginalized and unsafe, it could even spark its turning to 
the Russian Federation. Russia has increased its military spending,5 further 
developed its missile and nuclear arsenal,6 and holds military exercises 
in the neighbourhood of NATO member states. That could be defined 
as an outward challenge and could explain the convergence of these 
countries in the past few years, especially in the case of Hungary, as a 
new friend of the Russian Federation. 
The Russian military started its process of modernization and reformation 
in 2012 with a complete overhaul of its doctrine, which gave birth to a 
new armed force. Until then, Russia had held the doctrine from the former 
Soviet military which had defined its armed forces as a “mass army based 
on a general draft” (Kacprzyk 2016: 10), and that doctrine shifted towards 
a modern and professional armed force. Russia has also transferred 
the majority of its armed forces to the European part of Russia, or more 
precisely to its Western military district which is located on the border 
with four NATO member states. The importance of this district can also 
be seen in the decision made by Russian joint staff to give this district top 
priority in education, equipment and modernization (Kacprzyk 2016: 10). 
Russia has also completed the integration of Belarus in its Air and Missile 
Defence System, and with that it has completed its goal to create a solid 
front towards NATO (Kacprzyk 2016: 10). Another big issue for the Baltic 
states and Poland is the region of Kaliningrad,7 which is considered to 
be the most militarized region in Europe. A new problem emerged when 
the 152nd Missile Brigade was transferred to the town of Chernyakhobsk 
in Kaliningrad Oblast. The brigade is armed with the newest Iskander 
5 The Russian military budget has been rising since the start of the modernization and reformation of its military. The 2015 
budget was 54.5 billion US dollars and the 2016 stands at 49.2 billion US dollars, which makes it one of the highest in the 
world. For more, see Chance (2016).
6 Russia has developed the world’s most formidable nuclear missile, Satan 2. For more, see Shukla and Smith-Spark 
(2016).
7 Kaliningrad Oblast is a Russian enclave located between Poland and Lithuania. It is of very high strategic value for 
Russia, because it is located between NATO member states and missiles in that region can successfully target NATO 
member states in that region.
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missiles which can effectively hit targets in the Baltic states and in Poland8 
(Kacprzyk 2016: 11). 
At the moment, there is no imminent threat of conflict between Russia 
and NATO, but the military exercises which were conducted in Western 
Russia, such as Union Shield, Ladoga and West, have had the goal of 
rapid deployment and transportation of troops across the Western district. 
These exercises have shown a high level of readiness within the Russian 
armed forces and should be seen as a provocation towards the alliance 
(Kacprzyk 2016: 11). The countries that are closest to Russia are already 
viewing it as such, so Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, for example, are going 
to triple their military budget in fear of a Russian attack.9 Russian President 
Putin is opposing NATO enlargement to the east and, with invasions in 
Ukraine and Georgia, where Russia created disputed territories (South 
Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea), Putin made it clear that no country will join 
NATO. These two countries were very close to getting a Membership 
Action Plan for their membership in 2008, but Russia clearly opposed 
this and proceeded to invade them. “Putin now has the most favorable 
international environment since the end of the Cold War to continue 
Russian expansion. European unity is fractured. Alliance members are 
questioning the value of the mutual security pact. And the next American 
president seems openly favorable to Russia and ready to excuse Russia’s 
irresponsible behavior” (Miller 2016). The Times (22 Nov 2016) reported that 
Putin is moving his missiles to its western European enclave as a threat to 
Europe, which shows that the Baltic states have a special place in Russian 
foreign policy. Lithuania has already introduced compulsory military 
conscription, concerned about the geopolitical environment and its 
proximity to Kaliningrad.
Feeling threatened, Poland still believes that it is not getting enough help 
from NATO for protection against a possible Russian attack. Poland has a 
very interesting internal and external political situation. If we take a closer 
look to the internal political factors, Poland is a liberal democracy that has 
entered into a phase of crisis. The crisis began last year when parliamentary 
elections were won by the coalition led by the Law and Justice and 
8 The full range of the Iskander missile system is 700 km. From Kaliningrad Oblast, it can effectively target even Berlin. For 
more, see BBC (2016).
9 In 2020, the combined military budget of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia will be an estimated 2.1 billion US dollars, which 
is double the value in 2004. For more, see Reuters (2016).
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Civic Platform. Their win saw a major shift in Polish politics from liberal to 
conservative, which criticizes the foundation of liberal democracy. Polish 
President Jaroslaw Kaczynski openly claimed in his speeches that Poland 
should dismiss the weight of liberal democracy and that it must pave its 
own way (Buras and Balcer 2016). The external political situation of Poland 
is conditioned by its environment. Since its democratic transition, Poland 
has positioned itself as a leader of the anti-Russian coalition in Eastern 
Europe, and it holds this role until today. Because of fear of a Russian 
invasion, Poland is one of the few countries in the region that had its 
army completely modernized and reformed according to current NATO 
standards (ibid.). Similarly, Poland’s external political situation is affected 
by the situation in the region, where it borders Ukraine. Until 2014, Poland 
had a stable economic partner in Ukraine, but since the beginning of 
the aggression Ukraine has no capacity to be Poland’s partner. With the 
victory of the coalition of the Party of Law and Justice and Civic Platform, 
Polish official rhetoric became markedly anti-Western and anti-European 
(ibid.).
Poland would be affected the most were we to see a continuation of 
an aggressive Russian foreign policy. Also, we can notice a similarity 
between the two countries. Putin continues to use the uncertain domestic 
and foreign situation as an excuse to tighten the grip on his people, and 
in the past year the Polish political elite has started doing the same thing. 
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy has strengthened the anti-democratic 
forces within Poland and, if not dealt with properly, this situation will only 
continue to deteriorate (ibid.).
These political developments are extremely problematic for Poland, and 
if these problems are not resolved, NATO could face a new situation 
if Poland chooses to depart from NATO. The alliance has so far had a 
faithful and stable partner in Poland, but Poland is starting to feel more 
and more marginalized and ignored by Brussels. Poland feels that not all 
NATO member states realize its situation, as the focus is Mediterranean 
member states with Syria and the refugee crisis. NATO must find a way to 
return a sense of security and sense of importance within the alliance to 
Poland, because at this point further cooling of relations between Brussels 
and Warsaw would only go in favour of the Russian Federation. 
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Another Eastern European country that worries the NATO administration 
is Hungary. It maintains excellent political relations with Russia and 
traditionally leans economically to the East and the Russian Federation. 
Hungarian turning to Russia began in 2010, when Fidesz rose to power in 
Hungary and Viktor Orban became the new Prime Minister. One of his 
first official visits to a foreign country was a visit to Russia in November 
of the same year (Hegedus 2016: 1). Before the sanctions against the 
Russian Federation were imposed, imports from Russia amounted to 6.89 
per cent of total imports to Hungary. This may seem a small figure, but this 
percentage includes most Hungarian gas, oil and other fuel imports, and 
comprises an important part of its economy (ibidem.). From this arose the 
first fear that Hungary could fall under Russian influence, if Russia were 
to threaten Hungary with higher gas prices.10 NATO leaders were worried 
that this price could be the result of an agreement according to which 
the Hungarians will protect Russian interests within the alliance, but at the 
time of the adoption of sanctions against Russia, the Hungarians did not 
veto the decision (ibidem.). However, the suspicion and fear that the 
Hungarians might veto the decision is actually Orban’s favour to Putin, 
because it has been shown that the Russians can influence a country that 
is a member of NATO. 
A new, far heavier worsening of relations between Hungary and the 
countries in the NATO alliance, and between Hungary and other countries 
of the Visegrad Group, happened at the very beginning of the Ukrainian 
crisis when Orban called for the establishment of the autonomous region of 
Transcarpathia in Ukraine. In this historical region, Hungarians form a large 
minority and this statement was interpreted as an attempt to destabilize 
Ukraine and attempt to further tear apart Western allies, leading to the 
short-term isolation of Hungary from its neighbours (ibid.). 
Author Daniel Hegedus called Hungarian foreign policy a “peacock 
dance” (ibidem.) in which Hungary took two steps forward and then 
one back. An example of this is when Hungary introduced sanctions 
to the Russian Federation and accepted an agreement made at the 
NATO summit in Cardiff in 2015, but subsequently stopped the return of 
gas to Ukraine (ibidem.). This influence does not stop only at Fidesz, but 
10 That would not be possible, because Gazprom and the Hungarian government have signed a contract that 
guarantees Hungary a low price for about 22 billion m3 of gas.
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is probably a lot stronger in the Hungarian ultra-right party Jobbik. Jobbik 
has become the third political option in the country in the past few years 
and, unlike Fidesz, which is connected to Moscow by certain dirty jobs,11 
Jobbik is directly funded by the Kremlin (ibid.). But their connection does 
not stop there. Jobbik representative in the European Parliament, Bela 
Kovacs, finished college in Moscow at MGIMO University in 1986 and lived 
in Moscow until 2003. In 2010, Bela Kovacs became Jobbik’s representative 
in the European Parliament, and in 2014 he was accused of espionage for 
the Russian Federation by the Hungarian high state prosecutor; however, 
the case never came to trial because of his immunity as an MEP (ibidem.).
NATO alliance and new relations with the European 
Union
Many European and transatlantic NATO allies have become rather 
nervous over the new Russian role in international security, and NATO 
has started to insist upon and ask its European allies for a harsher tone in 
communications with Russia. However, Europeans still hesitate in sending 
Russia robust responses or harsh messages, especially given that the 
strongest EU member state is about to leave the Union — Great Britain 
after Brexit — but also being aware of the status of European defence 
capabilities. 
The NATO summit in Warsaw was also, in a way, a reminder of Western 
sanctions against Russia; however, Germany showed no firm position 
on the strategy towards Russia or on NATO’s presence in the Baltics and 
Poland, which very clearly showed how German politicians, especially 
Angela Merkel, are very cautious about the stand on Russia. According 
to a survey conducted by the Körber Foundation in March 2016,12 81 per 
cent of Germans favour closer ties with Russia and see Russia as an equal 
power with a rich culture and history. This kind of position towards Russia 
among Germans is also driven by economic interest, especially in relation 
11 We can see these connections in three jobs in particular: the Paks nuclear power plant, the MET gas supply scheme 
and the modernization of the subway cars on Budapest underground line 3. 
12 The survey was conducted among 1,000 individuals in Germany and 1,024 in Russia (Körber Stiftung Survey 2016).
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to gas pipelines. With better business ties between Russia and Germany, 
German politicians could have in mind that they will contribute to lessen 
the threat Moscow poses, and therefore are very mild towards Russia. In a 
‘Frayed Partnership’ survey (2016) carried out by the German Bertelsmann 
Foundation and the Polish Institute for Public Affairs13, a high percentage 
of Germans — 57 per cent — replied ‘no’ to the question should German 
soldiers stand in defence of NATO members Poland and the Baltic states 
if they are attacked by Russia, and 49 per cent of respondents do not 
believe that a permanent NATO military presence will increase their sense 
of security and therefore NATO should not create permanent bases in 
Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. These perceptions have security 
implications, especially for NATO, because the eastern alliance (Poland 
and Baltic states) wants NATO to do more to defend them, feeling 
threatened by Russia. For European security and unity of allies within 
NATO, it is very important how Germany perceives Russia, but also how it 
perceives NATO and its role within the alliance.
The Warsaw Summit was also characterized by NATO officials trying to seek 
confirmation on continued unity among allies concerned about a post-
Brexit European Union, while Great Britain has one of the alliance’s most 
capable militaries in Europe. Even countries that are not NATO members, 
such as Sweden, were and are concerned over Russian behaviour and 
would like to strengthen ties with NATO. “At this point of time we cannot 
afford to disagree on defence concerns,” said Swedish Defence Minister 
Peter Hultqvis during the Summit (Champion 2016). If Britain really leaves 
the European Union, it loses the influence it has had so far within the 
Union, and that could be a trigger for Britain to become more committed 
to the alliance. Losing one of the strongest military powers within the 
European Union could be dangerous for the rise of populist parties that 
very often aim at the rebirth of nationalism. Without a united Europe, not 
only could Russia present a problem, but Germany, too. Alan Posener 
in The Guardian thinks that Brexit is irresponsible and that the European 
Union, as well as liberal Germans, needs Britain (Posener 2016). Different 
crises are striking Europe, especially economic and migrant crises, but 
also a fear of terrorism, so there is a trend for right-wing populists to gain 
greater power in European countries such as Austria, Finland, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, even Germany and Great Britain with UKIP, 
13 ‘Frayed Partnership’ German public opinion on Russia (2016) gives an overview of reasons of declining German-
Russian relations since 2014.
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presenting challenges both to European democracies and to the process 
of European integration, which results in growing scepticism towards the 
EU.14 The rise of populist parties is dangerous for further integration of the 
EU and for its enlargement process, as they reject what the EU stands 
for and how it works. European values such as human rights, rule of law, 
human dignity, freedom, democracy and equality, which are shared by 
the NATO alliance, should not be given up on, as that would weaken the 
EU’s credibility, and endanger transatlantic ties. Referring to the utility of 
being a NATO member state and a partner country, Edström, Matlary and 
Petersson (2011) claim that a fundamental question is whether the utility 
of the partnerships is mutual, and if not, that is a problem. The answer 
seems to be that the partners seem to gain more utility from NATO than 
NATO gains from its partners. Only a united and unfractured Europe can 
be a security guarantor. During this fragile time for European unity, Russia 
is testing the transatlantic alliance, and the strongest EU ally, the United 
Kingdom, by enforcing Brexit, will lose the opportunity to have an influence 
from within, therefore making Europe more divided. “Without Britain, there 
won’t be anybody in the EU to defend sanctions against us so zealously,” 
wrote Sergey Sobyanin, the Mayor of Moscow, on Twitter in relation to 
Foreign Policy (De Luce and McLeary 2016).
It seems that Brexit contributed to fracturing the European Union and 
endangered the transatlantic community’s future of staying united. After 
the Presidential elections in the US, it is a question of what will be the future 
role of America, which has the most important position in NATO and which 
contributes most to the NATO alliance budget. After the win of Donald 
Trump, the world, and especially Europe, became worried about the US 
leaving the alliance. NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg said that 
the West faces its greatest security challenges in a generation, and that 
‘going it alone’ is not an option for Europe or the United States (Stoltenberg 
2016). One problem that the alliance faces is the budget, considering 
that the US currently contributes almost 70 per cent of NATO spending. 
Although it is in the utmost strategic interest of the US to have a stable 
and secure Europe, it could happen, with Trump as American President 
and his announcements, that the US reduces its financial contribution to 
NATO, which could make some European countries more fragile in the 
14 What is undeniably happening, however, is that the continent’s traditional mainstream parties are in full retreat. Across 
Europe, the centre-left social democrats and centre-right Christian democrats who have dominated national politics 
for 60 years are in decline. For more on this issue, see Goodwin (2011), Bröning (2016) and Henley et al. (2016).
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face of new threats and create unstable new relations in the international 
order. “It is all too easy to take the freedoms, security and prosperity we 
enjoy for granted. In these uncertain times we need strong American 
leadership, and we need Europeans to shoulder their fair share of the 
burden”, said Stoltenberg in Britain’s Observer newspaper (Stoltenberg 
2016). Stoltenberg also expressed his concern over Trump’s admiration 
for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who wants Russia to withdraw its 
forces from Russia’s borders. In such a constellation of new conditions, the 
European Union also faces challenges coming from within.
Almost ten years ago, NATO member countries agreed to commit a 
minimum of two per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) to 
spending on defence. This guideline principally serves as an indicator of 
a country’s political will to contribute to the alliance’s common defence 
efforts. However, even some of the rich EU countries, like Germany as 
the biggest EU economy, spend less than two per cent of their GDP on 
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Table 1: NATO military expenditure as percentage of GDP in 2016
Source: Wright (2016) 
It is only Greece, the United Kingdom, Estonia and Poland that spend 
more than two per cent of their GDP on defence. The effects of the 
financial crisis deeply affected European defence budgets, which 
resulted in stressing the ‘pooling and sharing’ mechanism within the EU 
(pooling and sharing of military capabilities) and the ‘smart defence’ 
agenda within NATO, which was presented by former NATO Secretary 
General Rasmussen during the NATO summit in Chicago. This multilateral 
cooperation shows the importance of countries working together and 
thus increasing efficiency. The approach is not new, but the member 
countries have still not developed a satisfactory level of trust to be able 
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to create more projects based on this agenda. “Defence establishments 
focusing on maintaining national structures and stepping on the brakes 
to protect what they have, risk to lose the chance of getting more, and 
will probably end up with less” (Biscop and Coelmont 2011: 2). Therefore, 
due to the inability of the European Union to be a more influential player 
on the security scene, it is obvious that European defence depends on 
NATO, and the importance of transatlantic ties is also shown in the new 
European global strategy, where, among other things, it says: “The EU 
needs to be strengthened as a security community: European security 
and defence efforts should enable the EU to act autonomously while 
also contributing to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO” 
(European Union 2016: 20).
The European Union, especially after the Lisbon Treaty, is working on 
strengthening its defence capabilities under the Common Security and 
Defence Policy. Without the UK, EU military defence capabilities are 
reduced, with Germany wondering whether to fully commit to EU common 
defence and France, on the other side, becomes the only bigger EU 
member country that has the political will and power to act. However, 
European defence depends on NATO and is still within NATO. “There is 
also the EU’s relationship with NATO to keep in mind. It has always been 
a challenge to avoid duplication and inefficiency between the EU and 
NATO. But the potential for divergence between the two entities could be 
magnified now that the United Kingdom is no longer around to bridge the 
breach” (Cilluffo and Cardash 2016). The two organizations share a majority 
of members and common values, and therefore share the same strategic 
interests and face the same challenges and threats. The European Union 
is an essential partner for NATO, and its effort in building its own defence is 
not taken as a duplication of roles with NATO. European security requires 
American engagement and presence on European territory.
The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger may have been right when he 
told CBS News in December 2016 that Trump’s presidency could present 
an extraordinary opportunity for US foreign policy, especially for US-Europe 
relations (Kroenig 2017: 2). On the other hand, one hundred days into his 
presidency, Europe is still struggling to make sense of newly elected American 
president Donald Trump. There is much consternation and vacillation in 
European capitals about what the Trump administration’s foreign policy will 
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entail. Europeans are not sure what Trump’s phrase ‘America First’ means 
for Europe and the traditional transatlantic relationship. 
During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump repeatedly spoke 
disparagingly of America’s allies. Accusing European partners in NATO 
of not paying enough for defence, Trump even went so far at that time 
as to entertain the option of pulling back US forces from Europe, even 
withdrawing the US from NATO and conditioning American security and 
military protection of Europe, unless European allies fulfil their obligations 
and increase their defence spending (Brattberg 2017). During his 
presidential campaign, Donald Trump even called NATO an ‘obsolete’ 
organization (Kroenig 2017: 4), but since taking office he has repeatedly 
voiced his support for the alliance.
The fear that American president Donald Trump would weaken US 
commitment to NATO has not materialized. Whether coming from 
President Trump himself, his Vice President Mike Pence at the Munich 
Security Conference in February 2017, or Secretary of Defence Jim 
Mattis, the Trump administration has repeatedly offered reassurance 
that it intends to continue to honour the almost seven-decade long US 
commitment to the transatlantic partnership and NATO. President Trump 
has even started to praise NATO’s growing defence spending and efforts 
to boost intelligence sharing and combat terrorism, remarking that NATO 
is no longer an obsolete organization. 
Concerning the European Union, during his presidential campaign 
Donald Trump showed scepticism about the multilateral institution. He 
has snubbed an invitation from European Council President Donald Tusk 
to attend the EU-US summit, advocated the exit of the United Kingdom 
from the EU and endorsed Eurosceptic candidate Marine Le Pen in the 
2017 French presidential election. Despite of all that, Donald Trump has 
sent a signal that he and his administration are going to cooperate with 
the EU. During a press conference with the Italian Prime Minister in the 
White House on 20 April 2017, Trump stated that a strong Europe is very 
important for him. Also, during his visit to Brussels, Vice President Mike 
Pence pledged strong American commitment to the European Union. 
European concerns that Donald Trump would lift some of the sanctions 
imposed on the Russian Federation after the crisis in Ukraine and Crimea 
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have not materialized.
However, the US administration is still sending mixed signals to the European 
allies, NATO members. Certainly it will take time to reassure and to repair 
the reservations many Europeans have about Donald Trump and his vision 
of Europe and the transatlantic relationship in general. The next NATO 
summit in Brussels in May 2017, and Donald Trump’s first visit to Europe 
during that summit, may be crucial.
Conclusion
Lots of new challenges and threats are appearing in contemporary 
international relations — Russian annexation of Crimea, deeper crisis in 
the Middle East, the threat of the so-called Islamic state — and therefore 
NATO at the Warsaw Summit renewed its focus on collective defence and 
deterrence, showing NATO’s commitment to Europe but also projecting 
stability beyond NATO. Warsaw was the last NATO summit for former 
American President Obama. It is striking how strongly he spoke about 
the solidarity of the United States with its European allies. In Warsaw, the 
United States, still with Obama as president, strongly determined to fill the 
military gaps existing between the country and European members of 
NATO, which for a decade European members were unable or unwilling 
to fill. The European Union, especially after the withdrawal of the United 
Kingdom, with the rise of populism in some European members of NATO 
and the new approach of new American President Trump towards NATO 
and its importance, poses a big problem for the unity of NATO. There 
is a potential danger of a strategic distancing of part of the European 
continent from the United States. For that reason, a way to preserve a 
stronger Euro-Atlantic bridge between the United States and the European 
members of NATO has to be found. 
By inviting Montenegro to participate in the Warsaw Summit, the Alliance 
confirmed that it is on its way to fully-fledged membership. However, little 
was said about the future of NATO’s ‘open door’ policy. The summit gave 
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a cautious nod in the direction of Ukraine and Georgia’s aspirations of 
membership, as well as those of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. 
“Although the military contributions provided by the newest allies are 
understandably limited, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that 
expansion had an immediate impact in stabilizing democratic civil-military 
relations in these new member states. The first positive impact of NATO’s 
expansion is evident in the democratic stability that the enlargement 
policy helped foster in NATO’s newest members” (Hendrickson 2007: 106).
The Warsaw Summit served as a confirmation of NATO’s decision to 
enhance military capabilities, especially on its eastern border, with Russia 
being active in the international arena again. It is important to stress that 
it was repeatedly stated in Warsaw that the alliance does not seek any 
confrontation and poses no threat to Russia if the safety and security of 
Europe and North America are not endangered. 
The main problem is, therefore, whether and how the Warsaw Summit 
commitments will be implemented in the future. NATO’s credibility as a 
value-based alliance will depend not just on more effective defence 
spending and other security measures, but also on the quality of the 
democratic systems of its member states. The main focus is still on outlining 
NATO’s enduring purpose in the new security environment, its influence 
on European stability and the nature of its fundamental security tasks: 
collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.
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